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 1. Introduction
The question about method which is prominent in the African philosophical 
place will here be addressed, not in the regular style of whether there is such 
or not but in real theoretic terms in that I will attempt to formulate what can 
be called conversationalism as a methodic option for African and intercultural 
philosophies. Even though some African philosophers like Ada Agada (2015) may 
not see the need for this enterprise there are others who do, such as Maduakolam 
Osuagwu (Osuagwu 1999, 9-91) and K C Anyanwu (Anyanwu 2000, 57-58). In 
agreement with these latter two, I think the methodological discourse in African 
philosophy is inevitable. Avoiding it is like postponing doomsday. For example, we, 
the practitioners of African philosophy, will someday come to a point where we 
must say something about the methodological disposition of African philosophy. 
Evidently, until African philosophers invest creative energy in clarifying their 
method(s), the problem of the “double bind” will continue to hang around the 
discipline. Robert Bernasconi captures the ‘double bind’ problem as follows: 
“either African philosophy is so similar to Western philosophy that it makes no 
distinctive contribution and effectively disappears; or it is so different that its 
credentials to be genuine philosophy will always be in doubt” (1997, 188). This may 
simply suggest that African philosophy done with Western formulated methods 
might fall short of a truly philosophical tradition in its own right. Indeed, it seems 
plausible to say that until the methodological dispositions of African philosophy 
are clarified, “…its credentials to be genuine philosophy will always be in doubt”. 
And by method I mean more of a tool for thinking rather than a school of thought, 
the latter being what ethnophilosophy, philosophic sagacity, universalist, literary 
and the hermeneutic approaches represent. No doubt, these methodological 
discussions I am calling for are as important as they are imperative if we are to 
add another meaningful layer to the discourse on philosophy in Africa. 
Thus articulating the method(s) of our enterprise might be something that 
can justify it and entitle it to the name ‘African philosophy’ as a tradition clearly 
different from, say, Western philosophy. But besides this, there is a lingering 
concern in academia about the relevance of philosophy as a discipline in today’s 
world. Perhaps the hope and survival of the venture of philosophy, in this post-
truth and postcolonial age, may now be sought outside of the Greco-European 
world. Impressively, Michel Foucault shares this optimism when he observes “[T]
he crisis of Western thought is identical to the end of imperialism […] [F]or it is 
the end of the era of Western philosophy. Thus if philosophy of the future exists, it 
must be born outside Europe….” (1999, 113). That new context for the resurgence 
of philosophy might as well be in Africa where African philosophers could shoulder 
the responsibility of producing the pedestal for the so-called future philosophy. 
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I am of the view that philosophy is still relevant to our contemporary world 
particularly in the areas of cross-cultural conversation and understanding. But 
philosophers must learn to turn on the light of reason and focus it on the worry 
of today’s world. Our world today, despite all of its progress, is in a constant 
state of tension brewed by our failure to communicate across cultural, ethnic, 
religious and epistemic borders and understand ourselves as human beings with 
a common destiny. This tension, it appears, is not something that technological 
advancement can douse. It is squarely something which the light of reason can 
smother. It does seem, therefore, that philosophy still has a mammoth role to play 
in making our world habitable, tolerant, peaceful and more equal. This is what 
philosophers must cash out on, and it should not matter from where the best 
strategy comes. The methodological disposition of conversational philosophy, 
an under-explored strategy from the African place, aims at not merely bringing 
humans together to talk to themselves but, more importantly, it focuses on 
getting them to talk meaningfully and to understand themselves. This, I suppose, 
may require an unbranded mechanism like the conversational method.
‘Understanding’ in a multicultural setting, we must admit, is not an easy goal 
to achieve. Often, there is a verticalisation of relationships. One cultural bloc 
or people set the rules of these relationships (whether epistemic, political or 
economic), perhaps not always with the intention to dominate the ‘other’ but that 
is what always turns out to be the case. They assume, quite in ignorance, that this is 
how things should proceed; that their own cultural particular is the internationally 
sanctioned modus operandi for diplomatic, economic and intellectual relations. 
But the fact is that what is usually regarded as the international, universalisable or 
globalisable rules of epistemic engagement are, ironically, the ones set up by the 
dominant culture. Or, more appropriately, the ones which a certain forerunning 
culture developed over time and now prescribes to the other trailing cultures as 
something that is universally granted. Interestingly, they seem to assume that 
whatever the other trailing cultures have is inferior and that it should not be a 
problem for them to realise and embrace the superior universally grantable idea 
from the West. When cross-cultural engagements take place on the bases of these 
one-sided principles of value allocation, most times, it is possible not only for the 
‘other’ to be disgruntled but for ‘understanding’ to fail either at the beginning 
or in the long run. I blame this scenario partly on the Greco-European logical 
mechanism for the allocation of values to propositions. An intellectual culture 
was set up by Aristotle and was further advanced by George Boole, who devised 
the mechanism in his algebraic logic for the allocation of a strict and unique value 
to each proposition. And this pattern was further explained by Gottlob Frege 
when in discussing the foundations of (Greco-European) thought proposed the 
following principle: “never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only 
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 in the context of a proposition” (1960, xxii). What this entails, broadly, is that 
any given proposition necessarily has to have a unique value to be determined 
only by the facts it asserts. But is this really correct at all times? My thinking is 
in the negative. Yes, it may be correct to assert that this logical pattern is true 
of all cultures and all peoples but maybe not all of the time. In a later section, I 
will advance this argument further using the principle of Context-dependence of 
Values (CdV), which states that premium should more accurately be placed on 
contexts in which propositions are asserted rather than on the facts asserted in 
such propositions in order to correctly allocate truth values to propositions. 
In this article, I will use the African notion of ‘relationship’ to formulate the 
method of conversationalism and provide clarifications on its structure and 
mechanism. I will demonstrate that conversationalism is a methodic extension 
beyond the gains of dialogue and polylogue. I will employ the principle of CdV to 
argue for the novelty and viability of conversationalism. I will then provide strong 
arguments to show that conversationalism deserves a space in the methodological 
accumulations of philosophy especially in these times of intercultural philosophy. 
2. The Method of Conversationalism
It is important to first clarify that the method which I seek to develop in this work 
called conversationalism is my own idea, representing what I think is another 
plausible way to philosophise in and beyond Africa. It is not something peculiar 
to Africa or something one can blindly generalise across African cultures. In the 
course of my arguments, I will make some claims. One that might raise some 
eyebrows would be that the raw material of my methodological construct, 
such as the notion of ‘relationship’ or ‘communion’, is something found in a 
rich reserve in sub-Saharan Africa. However, I am neither the first nor the only 
one to have made this claim. A host of other scholars have also made similar 
claim in different ways. I will highlight some of them later in the paragraph. One 
must insist nonetheless that the claim that this notion of relationship is found 
in many places in sub-Saharan Africa is neither false nor over-stated, and yet 
it does not in any way commit one to saying that it cannot be found in places 
outside Africa or even in greater proportion. What I claim here is simply that this 
notion of relationship understood as ‘a state of coming together to share and 
care’ is replete in the life-world of different cultures in the sub-Sahara regions and 
I here wish to tap into that to frame a method of thinking which can, to all intents 
and purposes, serve scholars beyond Africa. I should add that I intend to frame a 
conception of this notion of relationship that will be more sophisticated than the 
world-view version found in different African cultures. In a way, it is like finding 
a raw material and turning it into a finished product before exportation. Since the 
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context of this work is African philosophy, I will ground the new method in African 
philosophy but it would be a mistake to interpret this as restricting the application 
of the method to African philosophy or even to claim that it is unique to Africa.
The idea of relationship or communion or mutual interdependence is 
something that is inherent in many a sub-Saharan African culture. African thinkers 
like Pantaleon Iroegbu (1995) and Innocent Asouzu (2007) have appealed to this 
notion in developing ‘uwa ontology’ and ‘ibuanyidanda ontology’ respectively. 
Scholars like Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984), Kwame Gyekye (1997), Polycarp Ikuenobe 
(2006), and Bernard Matolino (2014) have employed it in constructing socio-
political theories of individual-community interaction. Thaddeus Metz (2011, 2013, 
2015 & 2017), specifically, has exploited it in developing what he calls an African 
theory of relational ethics. In southern Africa, several scholars working on ubuntu 
thought have also appealed to this notion in developing various strands of ubuntu 
ontology and ethics. These include Mogobe Ramose (2005), Leonhard Praeg 
(2014) and Fainos Mangena (2016). 
But what do I mean by relationship? Relationship as I conceive it in this work 
is a wilful, creative and critical epistemic experience which two agents known 
as nwa-nsa and nwa-nju share with the intention to create new concepts and 
open up new vistas for thought. Here, I seek to exemplify this idea of relationship 
using the methodological framework I call conversationalism. To converse, 
elementarily, suggests a coming together of some sort which is a prerequisite 
to any form of relationship. So, conversationalism presupposes a relationship 
although a type of relationship that is different from what happens when two 
lovers or two people who hate each other come together. The preceding example 
describes a ‘state’ whereas my conception is a ‘procedure’ and this procedure is 
critical, creative and complementary.
From the foregoing, it appears that this notion is central to philosophical 
thinking in sub-Saharan Africa but adequate attempt is yet to be made, to the 
best of my knowledge, to formulate a method for African philosophy from this 
notion of relationship. It would therefore not be out of place to attempt to tease 
out a method of thought from the notion of relationship. Asouzu’s method of 
complementary reflection that prescribes how one may think in a complementary 
way is the only attempt that comes close. However, his attempt still falls short 
of a clear formal expression. Besides, it was presented as custom-made for his 
doctrine of ibuanyidanda ontology. Here, I take up the task of formally articulating 
a method on the basis of the African notion of relationship for the fields of 
African and intercultural philosophies specifically but which can be employed by 
philosophers working on diverse topics in any part of the world. I have called 
that new method conversationalism bearing in mind that to converse is a form 
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 of engagement and this is a relationship of some sort. It will be my burden in this 
section to show how this relationship-driven procedure can amount to a veritable 
method of thinking. 
What might a method of philosophising from Africa look like? Conversatio-
nalism as a method is not just a procedure for an informal exchange of opinions 
between two people; that may be the literal meaning of the ‘word’ conversation—
something that can describe what the Kenyan philosopher Odera Oruka did 
with his famous doctrine of philosophic sagacity. Here, I deal with the ‘concept’ 
conversationalism and not the ‘word’ conversation. Oruka’s strategy is similar 
to Socratic dialectic, which is about mutual argumen tative exchange between 
individuals called interlocutors in which one asks questions and the other 
attempts to supply the answers. Such questions are intended to compel one 
to think critically and may lead to the revision or even abandonment of one’s 
initial position. This method is also called maieutics meaning midwifery. Socrates 
himself is described as a philosophical midwife who helps his interlocutors to 
bring forth the ideas laden in them. It is in this connection that the method is 
named after Socrates. 
Granted that the conversational relationship takes some measures of inspi-
ration from Socratic dialectic, it is important to note that they are not quite the 
same. Both of them prioritise the revision of positions and the opening of new 
vistas for thought but conversational relationship does not place a premium on 
telos as does the Socratic dialectic. The goal of the Socratic Method appears to be 
geared towards ‘proving a position false and establishing the truth of its negation’. 
The problem with this will become obvious when we consider a scenario in which 
an imaginary Ptolemy uses the Socratic Method in a dialogue with one of his 
students. Let us suppose that Ptolemy’s student holds a position that supports 
a heliocentric astronomical model. Would Ptolemy, a skilful argumentator and 
a believer in the geocentric model, and having the advantage of the scientific 
knowledge available at the time, not get his student to agree with him that the 
heliocentric model is false and that its negation is true? The answer is yes. Also, 
if this happens, would it still not be the case that later on someone like Nicholas 
Copernicus would complete a proof that the geocentric model is in fact false and 
that the heliocentric model, previously proven false by Ptolemy, is in fact true? 
Again, the answer is yes. What does this reveal about the Socratic Method? It 
reveals that it is capable of exposing philosophy to future danger if it allows for 
the certainty of the truth of philosophy to be established today on the basis of 
inaccurate facts only for it to be disestablished tomorrow when more accurate 
facts become available. For this, the conversational method prioritises the 
sustenance of the engagement over the outcome of such engagements. 
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Further, the conversational method represents a higher sophistication of 
portions of the Socratic Method. For one, it is not an engagement that can occur 
only at the individual level, it can also occur at cultural or group level. Thus for 
this, the conversational relationship occurs at both micro (individual) and macro 
(cultural) levels which paves the way for what is called intercultural philosophy. 
Also, the strategy of the conversational method is arumaristic rather than 
dialectic. I will explain this presently.
The idea of conversationalism goes back to the Igbo notion of ‘ịrụka’ or 
‘arụmarụ-ụka’ which roughly translates to ‘engaging in a critical exchange or 
conversation’ and has two senses: 1. ‘the act’ [but not the state] of engaging in 
a critical exchange; and 2. ‘the mechanism’ for engaging in a critical exchange. 
While the first sense describes its doctrine of conversational philosophy, the 
second sense describes its methodic ambience. When corrupted, the adjective 
‘arumaristic’ may be derived to qualify any relationship that is characterised by 
a critical exchange. The noun arumaristics therefore, may be defined as a type of 
critical encounter that involves the reshuffling of thesis and anti thesis, each time 
at a higher level without the expectation of synthesis.
As a method, conversationalism is a formal procedure for assessing the 
relationships of opposed variables in which thoughts are shuffled through 
disjunctive and conjunctive modes to constantly recreate a fresh thesis and anti-
thesis each time at a higher level of discourse without the expectation of the 
synthesis. Conversationalism presupposes relationship(s) between ‘nwa-nsa’ 
who is the epistemic agent that created an idea and therefore shoulders the 
responsibility of defending, clarifying or revising it and ‘nwa-nju,’ who can be 
defined as an epistemic agent that questions the viability and veracity of an idea 
created by nwa-nsa. This relationship is a critical one and may be described as a 
process of ‘creative struggle’. Creative, in that its foremost goal is to birth a new 
concept by opening up new vistas for thought; struggle, in that the epistemic 
agents involved pit themselves against each other in a continuous disagreement. 
Thus a conversational relationship is an arumaristic relationship. 
There are a few things that are worth noting in the conversational or 
arumaristic type of engagement as distinguished from a dialectic type of 
relationship. First, a conversational relationship is not a dialectic relationship in 
which components of thesis and anti-thesis come together to form the synthesis. 
It is rather an arumaristic relationship in which the struggle between thesis and 
anti-thesis is not just between two competing positions that culminates in the 
emergence of a new position (synthesis) made up of the components of the two 
rivals. In an arumaristic relationship, there is only one position at a time and 
the party that holds and defends it is called nwa-nsa. The philosophic duty of 
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 the rival party called nwa-nju is to question the viability and veracity of that 
position and by so doing compel nwa-nsa to revise, enrich or abandon the 
position. It is in this process that new concepts and thoughts are created. Thus 
while conversationalism promises a certain degree of epistemological alignment 
between two seemingly opposed variables, fundamental differences will always 
persist due to opposing ontological loyalties of the variables. This perpetuates the 
reshuffling of thesis and anti-thesis and frustrates the emergence of synthesis. 
In a dialectic relationship, this encounter between thesis and anti-thesis is not 
characterised by ‘creative struggle,’ it is rather characterised by, for wont of a 
better description, ‘creative surrender’. Creative surrender may be defined as a 
process in which compromise and concession mitigate on the encounter between 
thesis and anti-thesis in order to yield synthesis. 
Second, in an arumaristic relationship, thesis does not emerge out of the womb 
of synthesis; it is re-invented by nwa-nsa. The incessant questioning by nwa-
nju compels nwa-nsa to do constant evaluation of his position in light of new 
ideas and where necessary, he makes needful revisions to his position. This is, in 
my estimation, a procedure that accounts for knowledge growth and intellectual 
progress rather than dialectics-based methods such as dialogue and polylogue.
Third, what happens in a relationship between X and Y within the framework 
of conversational thinking can be described as complementation rather than 
synthesis. Both complement themselves in that while the one needs the other to 
re-invent itself at a higher level of discourse, the other needs the one to fulfil its 
philosophic duty. In the end, what happens is a continuous progress in thought. 
They do not reach a compromise by contributing components towards the 
formation of a new order—this is what synthesis is about in a dialectic relationship.
Fourth, in an arumaristic relationship, the thesis has a transgenerational life-
span. It keeps being re-invented and grows in sophistication, but in a dialectic 
relationship, a thesis’s life-span is generational. It fizzles out in each generation 
allowing room for the emergence of another thesis to take its place. 
To help make sense of the above points, it is important to explain how this 
method of conversationalism could be applied in practical terms. To begin with, 
conversationalism has two prominent theses, namely the ontological thesis 
and the logical thesis. It is from the spectra of these two that this method can 
be understood. 
Briefly, the ontological thesis states that ‘independent realities exist not 
as isolated units but as interconnected entities in a network’. Conceived in 
this way, conversationalists think of reality as one big network of variables 
some of which are opposed to some others, yet they are interconnected. 
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This accounts for why, at some point, even opposed variables that are in a 
disjunctive motion apart from each other come to discover the necessity 
of mutual interaction and enter the path of conjunctive motion once again. 
 So, there is a limit to how far apart the disjunctive motion could take the opposed 
variables—that limit is known as the complementary bar. However, despite 
the possibility of binary complementation, there is also a limit to how close the 
opposed variables can relate—that limit is called the benoke point. This concept is 
derived from a collection of Igbo words: bere which means ‘reaching’ and n’oke 
which means ‘the limit or terminal point’. Put together ‘berenoke’ or ‘benoke’ for 
short means ‘reaching the limit or terminal point’. This is the point beyond which 
opposed variables cannot get closer.
One could therefore see that despite their similarity there is a difference 
between a conversational relationship and a Hegelian dialectical relationship. 
Below is the diagram of a conversational curve that can enable us to measure the 
conversational relationships of seemingly opposed variables.
Definition: A Conversational Curve is a graphic representation of the aru-
maristic relationship between opposed variables, call them nwa-nsa and its 
nemesis nwa-nju. It is drawn with the motions of conversation on the vertical 
axis and the conversationalists themselves on the horizontal axis.
Conversational Curve:
Conversational Curve: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conversationalists 
Motion 
Tension of Incommensurables 
Disjunctive motion 
Conjunctive motion 
Concessional bridge 
 
Benoke point  
Complementary turn 
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 In the diagram above, one can observe the dotted disjunctive v-shaped lines 
which demonstrate how variables move apart and diminish their contact and 
interaction; and the conjunctive lines which demonstrate how seemingly 
opposed variables come close to interact. One can also observe a concessional 
bridge defined as a mechanism for determining when complementation has 
become necessary and has begun to take place between two opposed variables; 
and a complementary turn, which is defined as a mechanism for determining 
when the closest point of complementation has been reached. On top is the 
benoke point where the conjunctive lines could not meet and which is a point 
beyond which opposed variables cannot get closer. Finally, there is one called 
tension of incommensurables, defined as a mechanism for determining when the 
complementary relationship has collapsed. I will explain these concepts in more 
details in the next section.
The second thesis is the logical thesis and it states that ‘values are to be 
allocated to propositions not on the bases of the facts such propositions assert 
but on the bases of the contexts in which those propositions are asserted’. In this 
regard, one can see that context upsets fact. It is from this logical thesis that I 
articulate the principle of CdV, which I will discuss in more detail later in this work. 
What can immediately be gleaned from this thesis is that in conversationalism, 
we look at truth as something somewhat less rigid than the Aristotelian logical 
formulation as well as the Boolean algebraic equation would have us believe. The 
condensed idea in conversational thinking can therefore be stated: ‘The truth-
value of propositions could vary from one context to the other.’ 
Thus conversationalism as a method aims at a non-synthetic outcome 
i.e. it does not broach the transculturality of truth; it is rather, arumaristic. 
What conversational thinking does is the affirmation of what can be called 
the ‘intercommunication of truth’ which means that truths emanating from 
different contexts can recognise and confirm one another, but that is how much 
we can expect. Thus at contextual levels, truths have a life of their own but are 
somehow connected. One truth may confirm the other even though they may 
carry different values for the same set of facts – a practical solidarity of truths, 
if you will. For example, the proposition ‘one needs water to stay alive’ when 
contextualised in the Sahara Desert where one is dehydrating and in the River 
Niger where one is drowning, respectively; they will carry different values even 
though they contain the same set of facts. However, despite the difference in 
values, one confirms the other. Water could save your life in the desert but the 
same water could kill you in the river and vice versa. These truths are in solidarity, 
each enables one to understand the other better and I think this is supposed to 
be the drive behind all genuine efforts geared towards intercultural philosophy. 
Conversationalism epitomises this mechanism through a process known as 
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creative struggle—a continuous arumaristics without synthesis. This method is 
a perpetual process and a critical continuum by which the African philosopher 
or any philosopher for that matter can assess the relationships of diverse but 
interconnected entities, cultures and peoples, etc. The reshuffling of theses and 
anti-theses is a revision of some sort in which each set manifests a higher level 
of discourse. 
On the whole, this method of conversationalism points to the idea of 
relationships among interdependent, interrelated and interconnected realities 
existing in a network whose peculiar truth conditions can more accurately and 
broadly be determined within specific contexts. This relationship exists even 
between opposed variables propelled and regulated by the conjunctive and the 
disjunctive mechanisms that seek to preserve diversity while enhancing inclusion 
and focusing on the progress of thought. 
In conversational thinking, thoughts are expressed as variables in the structure 
of binary complementarity. But that two variables can complement does not 
mean that they lose their identities and merge into one. In a conversational 
relationship, their encounter is arumaristic which means that they come together 
and break up according to necessity. Thus two seemingly opposed variables can 
be in a disjunctive motion determined by their ontological variance and can 
revert to a conjunctive motion determined by their ontological equality.1 These 
motions represent the continuing reshuffling of sets of theses and anti-theses. A 
disjunctive motion is slowed down by what is called ‘concessional bridge’ – defined 
as a mechanism for determining when complementation has become necessary 
and has begun to take place. It is this steep bridge that eventually transforms 
the disjunctive motion into a conjunctive motion. At the other end, a conjunctive 
motion brings opposed variables to their closest relationship at what can be 
called a ‘complementary turn’ – defined as a mechanism for determining when 
the closest point of complementation has been reached – and is transformed into 
another disjunctive motion by what can be called a ‘tension of incommensurables’ 
– defined as a mechanism for determining when a complementary relationship 
has collapsed. 
In practical terms, let us imagine that agent X (code-named nwa-nsa) 
develops a theory A that claims to have systematised ubuntu as an ethical 
framework fit for modern application with a load of new concepts to drive the 
theory; agent Y (code-named nwa-nju) may decide to take agent X to task on 
the viability and veracity of his theory. He raises questions that will upset the 
1 Ontological variance refers to existential properties that make two entities different while 
ontological equality refers to existential properties that make two entities similar.
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 theory and as a result compels agent X to continue to fortify his theory, revise it 
or even abandon it. This process is known as creative struggle. Now this is where 
one might raise the curious question; is this all there is about the method of 
conversationalism? The answer is No! The turning point occurs at this juncture in 
that the conversationalists i.e. nwa-nsa and nwa-nju, are not expected to resolve 
this struggle, ever! On the one hand, every answer will give birth to new questions 
and with it new concepts. On the other hand, every question is expected to open 
new vistas for thought and elevate the discourse to a higher level. Thus the 
ultimate goal of the conversational method is the sustenance of the conversation 
and not the final resolution of questions. What this implies is that while methods 
such as dialogue and polylogue, following from a Hegelian type of dialectics, are 
open to the unity of opposed variables in a synthesis, conversationalism that rides 
on the crest of arumaristics regards synthesis as anathema. I will further explore 
the radical dimension of this method of thought by analysing the CdV principle 
which is the offshoot of the logical thesis discussed above.
3. Further Justification of the Method of Conversationalism: 
The Context-dependence of Value
Here, I employ an idea I have discussed in a number of works for some years now 
but which I now dub the ‘principle of CdV’ to justify the claim that what we call 
truth may not always be dependent on the collection of facts that a proposition 
asserts but rather on the context in which that proposition is asserted. Before 
I discuss this principle in detail, I would like to clarify the relationship between 
conversationalism and CdV using a geometrical analogy. In conversationalism, 
epistemic agents and contexts can be thought of in geometrical terms as points, 
each capable of independent self-manifestation, meaning that it can be analysed 
in ways not subject to its interaction with other entities, and complementary self-
manifestation, meaning that it can be analysed in ways subject to its interaction 
with other entities. Think of independent self-manifestation as points without 
lines connecting them and think of complementary self-manifestation as points 
connected together by a line or lines. As any distance between two points for 
example is a line, think of this line as a conversational relationship between 
epistemic agents and contexts represented by such points. CdV then affirms 
the individual identities of epistemic agents and contexts that are captured in 
conversationalism and upholds their viability such that we may now be able to, 
following the complementary mode of the conversational technique, talk about 
facts relative to contexts and their interrelation rather than stop at the framework 
of propositions that carry such facts in a non-complementary mode. 
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Conversationalism as a method begins from the premise that realities, 
though independent, exist in a network of interrelation in which the ideas of 
difference and equality are inherent, and do not exist as isolated units. In this 
complementary framework, conversationalism promotes equal inter-party 
engagement in a special way, i.e. by levelling the ground and ensuring a totally 
horizontal relationship; it focuses on the process that leads to the production 
of new concepts and thoughts rather than on a final outcome; it upholds the 
critical rigour of philosophy by discouraging definite answers; and relocates truth 
value from the facts embedded in propositions to the context of propositions 
themselves thereby making the notion of truth function dynamic.
From the preceding, conversationalism riding on the crest of CdV seems to 
affirm relativism and to oppose the objectivity of truth. The question is, what is 
my motivation for urging us to switch from an objective analysis of truth captured 
in theories like correspondence to a relativised option? My motivation is due to 
the apparent fluctuations inherent in history. What is asserted as objectively true 
at one point in history turns out to become false at some other later historical 
time when circumstances change or when other facts become available. Take 
the example of the geocentric and the heliocentric model of the universe as one 
case. Consider also the case of colonialism, thought to be just at some historical 
time but now considered to be an unjust ideology that decimated, robbed and 
even underdeveloped a continent like Africa, as Walter Rodney states.2 Cases like 
these abound in our epistemic edifice. Are we supposed to pretend that they have 
no credibility? No, we should not! This was what motivated the Einstenian physics 
in modern science. As much as the idea of truth relativity alarmed the scientific 
world, in practice, research has shown that it is a fact of life. Whether in the 
sciences or in the humanities, many cases abound in which contexts determined 
the values of facts. Yet, this does not in any way vitiate the credibility of objective 
truth. We also know from common sense that objective truth makes a lot of logical 
sense. Where then does this apparent paradox lead us? One way to look at it 
would be to think about a middle course, something that removes the straitjacket 
that appears to characterise both objective and relative truths. The straitjacket 
is not only a problem for objective truth; it is also a problem for relativism. For 
example, relativism says that every truth is relative except the truth of its own 
assertion. That would make the truth of relativism objective at least, and this 
straitjacket contradicts its basic assertion. So, the problem is that if we remove 
this straitjacket from objectivism it would lose its meaning; and if we remove it 
from relativism, it would lose its foundation and collapse. This is a problem in 
2 See Walter Rodney. How Europe Under-developed Africa. Lagos: Panaf, 2009. This work describes 
in horrific detail the evils of colonialism on Africa. 
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 foundationalism as well as in the theory of justification broadly conceived. I here 
admit quite humbly that conversationalism and its handmaid, the CdV, may not 
escape from this problem and I do not have an immediate solution either. But 
the encouraging thing is that I do not think that the presenting of this problem 
constitutes adequate grounds to deter me from constructing a pro-relativism 
theory as I do in this work. My reasons are as follows: 1. History teaches us that 
contexts play vital roles in determining the values of facts. 2. Philosophy in our 
time seems destined to cross borders and if intercultural philosophy is to make 
any sense at all, we must be charitable and defend a certain strand of epistemic 
relativism. This definitely would come at a cost but I would prefer to invite other 
thinkers to dwell on what happens as a consequence rather than shy away from 
making what I think is a reasonable epistemic commitment. 
However, I do believe that my inclination to relativism can profit from a 
reasonable moderation. Thus I am motivated to anchor my idea of CdV on Kwasi 
Wiredu’s position concerning John Dewey’s warranted assertibility embedded in 
the idea of notions of truth3. Wiredu however quarrels with Dewey for failing to 
highlight the importance of ‘point of view’ as contrasted from ‘notions of truth’. 
In this regard, Wiredu appears to claim that besides objective truth, there may 
be another point of view which is a rationally warranted judgement. What this 
suggests is that the truth or falsity of propositions can be analysed relative to 
the contexts in which they are stated and such may be judged to be rationally 
warranted. So, for example, while CdV taken alone implies that person X’s assertion 
in the 18th Century that colonialism was justified is true relative to the context in 
which person X asserts it, this alternative point of view, based on the reading 
of Wiredu, would imply that although we take seriously the context in which 
the proposition was asserted, we nevertheless can judge person X’s assertion 
to be false in light of what we now know, i.e., that there are overwhelming 
context-independent reasons for thinking that colonialism was unjustifiable – 
notwithstanding the particular context in which its truth was previously asserted. 
The advantage of this alternative approach is that it is not committed to some 
objective, mind-independent truth, which I have described as a straitjacket, but 
nevertheless it supports the goal of intercultural philosophising which aims at 
affirming the epistemic credibility of different cultures or philosophical traditions 
as rationally warrantable judgements. On the basis of the accommodation 
of another point of view capable of being rationally warranted, progress in 
philosophy may be imagined as approximating as much as possible these types 
3 See Kwasi Wiredu. Philosophy and an African Culture. 1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 157-158. See footnote 11 as well.
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of judgements through intercultural engagements. This is the main focus of my 
argument for the relative evaluation of the truth of propositions.
Therefore, CdV can be stated as saying: ‘Propositions can be evaluated true 
or false not, as we suppose, on the bases of the facts they assert but rather, on 
the bases of the contexts in which they assert those facts.’ One of the direct 
implications of this principle is that facts would not be the primary ingredients for 
determining the values of propositions, contexts would be. And, of course, this 
may upset the notion of truth peddled in the traditional theories of truth in which 
there is a primary focus on the relationship between facts and propositions that 
assert them. I would like to think of this seeming anomaly as a scenario in which 
context upsets fact. Call it ‘factual anomaly’ if you will, but it points to a revelation 
that facts may not always be what they seem to be. Metaphorically, we can say 
with hesitation that facts prostitute themselves from context to context.
Another implication is that in intercultural philosophy, different philosophical 
traditions represent viable contexts as opposed to the dogma of one universal 
tradition. So, truth manifests from context to context from which a form of 
intercommunication or solidarity can be exercised. To engage across borders, 
different philosophical traditions require a tool that is not only accessible to 
all, but usable as well. It is for this need that I formulate conversationalism as 
a method that is not border-biased to guide African philosophy specifically and 
intercultural enquiries generally.
On the whole, what the CdV really indicates to philosophers is ‘never ask for 
the value of a proposition except in a specific context’. When extended, this also 
applies to the truths of philosophy. Here, I take philosophy to be a tradition-by-
tradition activity rather than a towering architectonic structure that imposes 
one cultural mind view on other cultures. On their own, when not placed in 
any contexts, most propositions are value-neutral. For example, consider the 
proposition ‘you need to drink water to stay alive’. When considered from the 
Boolean algebraic equation, this proposition will have the value 1. But this may 
be a little hasty if we take into consideration, as I think we should, such a serious 
concern as the context of that proposition. For one who is in the middle of the 
Sahara Desert on a hot afternoon, the value of the proposition will be 1; but for one 
who is drowning in the River Niger, even if on a hot afternoon, that proposition 
cannot be true, its Boolean value will be 0. A drowning man has probably gulped 
more than enough water and may not need more. What he does need to stay 
alive is air, more water will simply kill him. The preceding water analogy is one of 
several examples in which context upsets fact.
All of these attributes are attractive to the demands of intercultural philosophy 
which some consider the future of philosophy. Franz Wimmer (1996, 45-57) 
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 argues that it is not merely another branch of philosophy but the direction in 
which philosophy in this age should go. For von Hamid Reza Yousefi, “Intercultural 
philosophy is not a branch of traditional philosophy, but rather a correction and 
extension of the same” (2007, 199). Yousefi further shows that “intercultural 
philosophy is based on the fact that other peoples also possess Reason and 
rationality. The answer to the oft-posed question ‘what’s the good of intercultural 
philosophy’ is found here. Accordingly, one of the tasks of intercultural 
philosophy is to question and relativize the self-erected claim of the universality 
of views from reductive philosophy in terms of the history of ideas, philosophy 
and development. In so doing, a dialogue may be conducted as equals between 
traditions of thought” (2007, 121). Also, Heinz Kimmerle for his part explains that 
what is at stake is not merely “attaining recognition for intercultural philosophy 
as a greater or smaller specialization of philosophy”, but that “[T]he philosophical 
contribution to a renegotiation of the relationship between cultures is decisive for 
the status of philosophy today.” “This contribution”, Kimmerle insists, “concerns 
one of the main issues of our time – upon whose solution the possibility of a 
humane and dignified life greatly depends.” He goes on to note that, “it is for this 
reason that philosophy must either become intercultural, or else become nothing 
more than an academic preoccupation void of societal relevance” (1994, 31). 
Murray Hofmeyr (51-76) engages with Kimmerle’s submission on the need for 
intercultural philosophy resting on the idea of difference and equality which 
is the pre-condition for a true dialogue. He, however, points out that there is 
both a promise and a problem for this new orientation. Intercultural philosophy 
represents an intellectual attempt to reclaim our best human ideals but the 
question of whose method and rules will always raise the problem of dominance 
and the schism between the self and the other. Hofmeyr appears to suggest that 
negotiating this schism should not be expected to be easy and I think he is correct. 
This is perhaps where the advocates of dialogue and polylogue as methods run into 
problems. For example, in a bid to overcome all obstacles and indeed, all divisive 
mindsets, it is easy for the frameworks of dialogue and polylogue as tools of 
intercultural engagement to become compromised. Talk of tolerance will come in 
and with it, compromise. I understand when thinkers like Yousefi argues that “the 
research on tolerance and communication, since relationships between cultures 
can only be peacefully cultivated if the dialogues between them are established 
and carried out on the basis of mutual tolerance” (2007, 120). But it is not always 
clear when the demand for tolerance extends to compromise. Yes, we want to see 
different philosophical traditions engage and on equal platforms, but we do not 
want this engagement to derail from the path of rigour and become sociological. 
Advocates of relational equality like Kimmerle, Adhar Mall and Wimmer 
contend that the cause of intercultural philosophy will be better served using 
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a methodic ambience that encourages fair and equitable engagement. While 
Kimmerle (1994) and Mall (2000) favour the mechanism of dialogue, Wimmer 
(1996, 2007) opts for polylogue. Obviously, the only difference between these two 
methods concerns the number of units that may enter the engagement. While 
dialogue emphasises two, polylogue gives room for as many as there are. Their 
common strength appears to be twisted around the admiration for fair, tolerant 
and equal engagement. However, I find it plausible to claim that both dialogue and 
polylogue have a common weakness as well. Because of their over-commitment 
to levelling the ground of engagement for all parties and causing actors to 
engage across cultures with mutual sense of concern, they unwittingly lead to an 
overdose of sentiments by expecting a form of consensus, almost in desperation, 
from every possible intercultural encounter. This mindset, arguably, could water 
down the philosophical rigour in both dialogue and polylogue. It does not matter 
if the advocates of the two methods are willing to admit it. Every mother thinks 
her cooking skills are spectacular and hardly admits that her soup might not be 
delicious. Perhaps, common sense will arbitrate between my judgement about 
those two methods and what the advocates think about their methods. Some 
recent advocates of dialogue as a philosophical method like Bruce Janz (2016, 
41-42) will argue for its sustained rigour but it is hard to convince anyone that 
where compromises and consensus are on the table, that this clinging on to rigour 
will last the stretch. So, since this doubt exists and it is credible enough, I am 
inclined to toy with something new and more reliable hence, my proposal for 
the conversational method in which priority is with the sustenance of this rigour 
and the sustenance of the engagement. Dialogue/polylogue may also prioritise 
engagement at the beginning but soon afterwards, it tends to want so much 
more. A good dialogue/polylogue ends with peace and actors will most times 
want to make their dialogue a good one and there may be nothing anyone can do 
about this sentiment. 
I am not writing off dialogue/polylogue just yet. In fact, in dialogue/polylogue, 
actors disagree and agree, the argument may be tense at some point, and there 
may not even be a final outcome, and the very activity of dialoguing/polyloguing, 
the opening up of new vistas and different perspectives, is in itself rewarding! It 
may just be as desirable as achieving consensus. No one would be able to doubt 
the philosophical richness of the methods of dialogue and polylogue. Yet, it would 
not be out of place to observe and to humbly admit that dialogue and polylogue 
may not promise incessant questioning and sustained critical intensity for the 
reasons associated with the ideals of peace, tolerance, consensus, synthesis and, 
possibly, compromise. I think that dialogue and polylogue would be most fitting 
for comparative philosophy where we compare and contrast the methodological, 
metaphysical, epistemological and ethical theories of two or more distinct 
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 philosophical traditions with the aim of testing their commensurability or 
otherwise. There is little or no room for intellectual aggression of the kind that 
would require actors to make judgements on the viability and otherwise of one 
another’s positions. Unlike comparative philosophy, intercultural philosophy 
is full of animadversions. Actors across cultures are expected not merely to 
engage but robustly, to make critical judgement on the positions of one another. 
Intercultural philosophers thus are constantly constructing, deconstructing and 
re-constructing where the aim is to extend the frontiers of human knowledge as 
a whole.
It is true, as Yousefi says, that intercultural philosophy aims at establishing the 
reign of what he calls ‘communicative Reason’ which affirms that all cultures and 
peoples possess and employ the tool of reason with which to fairly engage with 
the others. And that the idea of all-embracing universal reason as Meinrad Hebga 
(1958, 223) calls it is a dogma; but there is a level to which particular cultural 
manifestations of reason will be watered down and will lose their philosophical 
venom. Reason needs to be constantly challenged not pampered. But dialogue 
and polylogue do not seem to guarantee this for the full stretch. So, one sees that 
there is something fundamentally weak inherent in these two methods when 
employed in intercultural discourse and we as philosophers must be courageous 
enough to admit it. 
Corroborating these observations, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in their 
magisterial work What is Philosophy? clearly point out that philosophy is not 
dialogue or communication, “which only works under the sway of opinions 
in order to create ‘consensus’ and not concepts” (1994, 6). This exchange of 
opinions between people whether one calls it communication or dialogue is what 
Deleuze and Guattari ridicule as a Western idea of democratic relationship of say-
your-opinion-and-it-will-count, which for them “has never produced a single 
concept” (1994, 6). Proper tools of philosophy, they argue, yield new concepts 
and not consensus because philosophy is that discipline that is concerned with 
the production of concepts hence, “…the following definition of philosophy can be 
taken as being decisive: knowledge through pure concepts” (1994, 7).
Obviously, we want to do intercultural philosophy but we must not aspire to 
do it the easy way. Dialogue and polylogue constitute the easy way to intercultural 
philosophy because they primarily want to arrive at an objective truth or, put 
differently, at a transcultural truth. But it is difficult to conceive a transcultural 
truth. If assertions 1, 2, 3, for example, in contexts A, B, C, are all true, what would 
become the truth value of assertions 1, 2, 3 when collected in context D considering 
the possibility that 1 and 2 or 1 and 3 or 2 and 3 or 1, 2, 3 may all be contradictory? 
This is the foremost challenge that confronts the bid for transculturality of 
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truth suggested by dialogue and polylogue respectively. Although, the idea 
of different notions of truth may be hard to defend, another point of view, as 
Wiredu describes, of the same notion of truth may be feasible given the easily 
demonstrable idea that circumstances alter the truth of propositions in different 
contexts. The intercultural philosophers who promote dialogue and polylogue 
fail to think in this direction. And what is this thing called consensus? This is an 
enticing poison borrowed from the mantra of Hegelian dialectics. That for every 
encounter between thesis and anti-thesis, a resultant synthesis is inevitable. 
Well, this does not seem to be correct anymore. Philosophy, I am inclined to 
think, is sustained at the collision of thesis and anti-thesis and this collision must 
be continuous. An alternate point of view seems to sustain this progress which 
should neither terminate at some point nor discontinue for whatever reason or 
even transform to something else. It is for this reason that conversationalism 
broaches philosophical problematique as transgenerational. And the process of 
attending to such problematique should be a critical and a creative continuum 
– an arumaristics, a reshuffling of thesis and anti-thesis that spins out new 
concepts and thoughts from the factory line of intercultural ideas. Anything else 
beyond this ridge, whether one calls it synthesis or consensus, cannot possibly 
be philosophy in the ‘A’ sense of the term. Both dialogue and polylogue constantly 
wobble along this borderline. For these obvious weaknesses, conversationalism is 
put forward to continue the journey of reason where dialogue and polylogue stall. 
Conversationalism, therefore, should be seen more like a meticulous house 
cleaner that is capable of tidying the house of intercultural philosophy. Much of 
the confusions about the nature and promise of intercultural philosophy have 
stemmed from the fogginess around its preferred method. My thinking is that 
conversationalism might be a desirable methodological option for veritable 
intercultural engagements. 
Also, in these edgy times, when some African scholars are calling for a decolo-
nised and Africanised philosophy, maybe, a methodic orientation inspired and 
cultivated in the sands of African thought might herald Africa’s contribution to 
the edifice of philosophy. John Lamola (2016, 501-512), Mogobe Ramose (2016, 
546-555) as well as Simphiwe Sesanti (2016, 429-443) in various ways have 
expressed the views that the philosophy curriculum and the history of philosophy 
itself are too colonial and needed to be decolonised. Others like Thaddeus Metz 
(2016, 490-500) and Ernst Wolff (2016, 444-459) take a conciliatory path rather 
than highlight the necessity for decolonisation or Africanisation. While Metz 
argues that materials from both the African and Western philosophical traditions 
can be usefully integrated in forging a balanced philosophy curriculum, Wolff is 
of the view that striking this balance both in terms of curricula and manpower is 
critical to a more equal philosophy practice in Africa. 
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 What stands out here is the idea of cross-cultural engagement in philosophy, 
which is encapsulated in the African notion of relationship captured effectively 
by the method of conversationalism. Obviously, it would not be too much if one 
adds to this demand the necessity for this intercultural engagement to be at a 
prime philosophical level undiluted by sentiments of one form or the other which 
the lure of consensus can supply. To this end, I propose conversationalism as a 
veritable methodological option for intercultural discourse. 
4. Conclusion
In this work, I have formulated a method known as conversationalism inspired by 
African philosophy and showed that it could be a veritable method for intercultural 
philosophy. I demonstrated that conversationalism is a methodic extension of 
the gains of dialogue and polylogue. I argued that conversational relationship is 
not Hegelian because it aims to avoid synthesis and rather focuses heavily on 
the reshuffling of thesis and anti-thesis. I gave a background to conversational 
thinking putting forward two theses that enable one to understand the methodic 
projection of conversationalism. I further elaborated on the second thesis known 
as the logical thesis and formulated the principle of CdV to advance a strong 
argument that truth of propositions may not depend on the facts they assert 
but rather, on the context in which such propositions are located. I toyed with 
some new concepts such as ‘intercommunication of truth’ ‘factual anomaly’ and 
‘practical solidarity of truth’ to support the above claim. This radical method spun 
from the cotton of African philosophy, I argued, deserves a place in the methodic 
accumulations of philosophy perhaps, as a construct that needs to be criticised, 
accepted or rejected or, which is more important, as something that endorses the 
viability of the idea of intercultural philosophy. 
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